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The Effect of Cross Listing on Management Forecast Specificity 
and Accuracy in the Netherlands 
 
Abstract 
We investigate management forecasts by Dutch firms in relation to cross listings by these 
firms in the US or the UK. Cross listings are associated with legal and reputational bonding, 
since firms with a cross listing in the US or the UK face greater legal liability exposure and 
closer scrutiny by financial intermediaries than do non-cross-listed firms. As a result, after 
obtaining the cross listing, these firms face greater potential costs of misrepresenting 
information. Our findings suggest that cross listing in a stricter environment influences 
management forecasts in terms of management forecast specificity, accuracy, and 
conservativeness in two opposite directions: although cross-listed firms make smaller forecast 
errors, their forecasts are less precise and more conservative. Our analysis of shareholder 
wealth effects shows that the net effect of the cross listing is positive upon the announcement 
of a management forecast.   
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1. Introduction  
We provide evidence on how cross listings by Dutch firms in the US or UK affect their 
voluntary disclosure decisions. Our theoretical premise is that firms voluntarily engage in 
bonding by cross listing in countries with better governance and disclosure regimes, such as 
the US or UK (see La Porta et al., 1998; 2000 and Saudagaran and Biddle, 1995), thus 
reducing their agency and information costs, and hence, their cost of external financing 
(Coffee, 1999, 2002; Stulz, 1999). We investigate whether the more demanding environment 
in the US and UK influences Dutch firms’ disclosure policies in terms of management 
forecast specificity, accuracy, and conservativeness. In addition, we measure shareholder 
responses to forecast announcements. 
The bonding literature distinguishes between legal and reputational bonding. Legal 
bonding presumes that firms in countries with weaker institutions and investor protection 
voluntarily list their shares abroad to subject themselves to stricter enforcement rules and 
higher regulatory required disclosure, thereby obtaining access to outside finance at a lower 
cost (Coffee, 1999, 2002; Stulz, 1999). In addition to stricter public enforcement, firms face 
stricter private enforcement, as they expose themselves to additional scrutiny and monitoring 
from ‘reputational intermediaries’, such as securities analysts and debt rating agencies 
(Coffee, 2002). According to Siegel (2005), market-based incentives induce reputational 
bonding, under which ‘firms can show over time, through good insider behaviour, that they 
deserve a reputational asset in the market for outside capital’ (Siegel, 2005, p. 349). Those 
firms with better reputations can gain privileged access to external capital. 
We have chosen to study the Dutch setting, because a relatively large number of 
companies have a cross listing in the US or UK. Both legal and reputational bonding can 
explain this large number of Dutch firms with a cross listing. We argue that the greater legal 
liability exposure, as associated with legal bonding, and relatively close scrutiny and 
monitoring by financial intermediaries, as associated with reputational bonding, affect a firm’s 
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voluntary disclosure policies in general, and in particular its management forecast specificity, 
accuracy, and conservativeness. Moreover, financial markets assess these firm policies in their 
price reactions to forecasts announcements. 
Managers voluntarily disclose earnings forecasts to adjust investors’ expectations 
towards their own expectations (Ajinkya and Gift, 1984; Hassell and Jennings, 1986). 
However, when investors suspect misrepresentation, the firm and its management might suffer 
reputation damage and might also experience legal actions. We argue that the legal 
environment and additional scrutiny of Dutch firms cross listed in the US or the UK increases 
the potential costs of misrepresenting information.  
To examine the influence of cross listings on management forecast decisions, we study 
1,896 press releases in which 168 Dutch firms disclose 2,781 earnings forecasts. Of these 168 
firms, 21.4% have a cross listing in the US and/or the UK. We make two distinctions in cross 
listings. The first is between exchange cross listings (i.e., US ADR Level 2 or 3 listings and 
UK listings on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) or the Alternative Investment Market 
(AIM)) and  cross listings on the US and UK over-the-counter (OTC) markets, because the 
regulatory exposure is more stringent for exchange listings. The second distinction is between 
cross listings in the US and the UK, because, among other considerations, mandatory 
disclosure levels for listed firms in the US are higher compared to those in the UK 
(Saudagaran and Biddle, 1995; Bianconi and Tan, 2008).  
Our results demonstrate that management forecasts disclosed by cross-listed firms are 
strongly influenced by the potential legal and reputational penalties. Managers of cross-listed 
firms use two strategies. First, we find that the forecast specificity is significantly lower, 
indicating that managers are less precise in their forecasts. Second, that the forecasts have 
smaller errors and are more conservative (i.e., less optimistic). Further, although the reduced 
forecast errors demonstrate improved forecasts, this conservative approach introduces a bias. 
Overall, we conclude that because of the management’s anticipation on legal and reputational 
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penalties, the management forecasts are influenced by a cross listing in two opposite 
directions. In order to measure the net effect of the cross listing we analyze shareholder 
wealth effects upon the announcements of management forecasts and find that cross listed 
firms on a US exchange are significantly more positive.  
The contribution of our paper is twofold. First, our study enhances the understanding 
of managers’ decisions on earnings forecasts in relation to the bonding literature, which 
typically emphasizes the motivations for cross listings from the ex ante positive effects of 
bonding and capital market perceptions of cross-listed firms. Our evidence on managerial 
decision making shows that the stricter environment associated with bonding also has two 
opposite effects on the informativeness of forecasts. However, the net effect remains positive. 
Second, while most empirical studies examine management forecasts by US firms, we add 
international evidence on forecasts.1
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we review the literature cross listings 
and management forecasts. In Section 3 we formalize our three hypotheses and in Section 4 
we discuss the institutional background of Dutch firms. In Section 5 we present the data set, 
define the variables, and describe the models. In Section 6 we discuss the results of our tests 
on forecast specificity and accuracy.  In Section 7 we analyse the effects of cross listings on 
announcement effects. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review  
2.1. Cross listings 
Previous research documents the benefits for firms with cross listings.2
                                                 
1 See Hirst, Koonce, and Venkataraman (2008) for an extensive survey of the management forecasts literature. 
 For example, Miller 
(1999) and Foerster and Karolyi (1999) find that the announcement of a cross listing in the US 
2 See Karolyi (1998; 2006) for extensive reviews of the cross-listing literature. 
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yields an average abnormal announcement return of 1%. Foerster and Karolyi (2000) find that 
firms from countries with low accounting standards that cross list on a major (US) stock 
exchange outperform their local market over the three years after cross listing. Sami and Zhou 
(2008) show that Chinese firms with a cross-listing on the Hong Kong stock exchange have a 
lower cost of capital and higher firm value. Bianconi and Tan (2008) not only examine the 
cross-listing premium of US cross listings, but also that of UK cross listings. Their results 
indicate that firms that originate in Asia-Pacific countries and cross list in either the US or the 
UK trade at a premium. 
Two of the commonest motivations for the cross-listing premium are market 
segmentation and liquidity. Studies such as those by Foerster and Karolyi (1999, 2000) and 
Miller (1999) find that in segmented markets, a cross listing makes the shares available to a 
larger investor base, which allows risk sharing and reduces capital costs. Domowitz et al. 
(1998) find that liquidity benefits arise from lower trading costs.  
Bonding is a more recently documented motivation for firms to cross list their shares 
(Coffee, 1999, 2002; Stulz, 1999). Its premise is that weaker shareholder protection and 
enforcement in the home country provides capital market participants with limited assurance 
that managers and controlling shareholders will not appropriate funds. As a result, these firms 
have difficulties raising capital at reasonable prices. To provide a higher level of assurance to 
capital markets, controlling insiders seek to credibly commit to reducing agency costs and the 
risks of appropriation by cross listing their shares in countries with stricter governance 
regimes. Controlling insiders are willing to give up their private benefits if the value of having 
access to cheaper external capital compensates for their loss of private benefits. 
The bonding literature distinguishes between legal and reputational bonding. Legal 
bonding, which is introduced by Coffee (1999, 2002) and Stulz (1999), assumes that 
companies in countries with weak institutions and investor protections can use cross listing to 
voluntarily subject themselves to stricter enforcement and higher mandatory disclosure. 
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However, Siegel (2005) shows that cross-listed firms’ compliance with US laws can be low, 
and that investors and regulators often hold back from taking enforcement actions. Siegel 
argues that reputational bonding, rather than legal bonding, explains firms’ motivation to 
cross list. Following Diamond’s (1991) model, Siegel suggests that firms can show that 
through good insider behaviour over time, they deserve a reputational asset in the financial 
market among parties such as investors, security analysts, and the business press.  Even 
though Siegel (2005) challenges the legal bonding motivation, both Siegel (2005) and Coffee 
(2002) allow for bonding through ‘reputational’ intermediaries, such as securities analysts, 
debt-rating agencies, or auditors. 
Several empirical studies support the bonding arguments. For instance, Reese and 
Weisbach (2002) show that after cross listing in the US, firms from countries with weak 
investor protection issue more equity in their home country. Doidge et al. (2004) show that 
firms with a cross listing in the US trade at a premium relative to firms without such a cross 
listing, and that this premium is negatively related to the level of investor protection in the 
firm’s home country. Doidge (2004) confirms the arguments that the controlling insiders of 
US cross-listed firms have lower private benefits of control by showing that these firms have 
lower voting premia than do firms without a cross listing in the US, and that the difference is 
greater for firms from countries with poorer investor protection. Finally, Doidge et al. (2009) 
show that the number of cross listings in the US and UK have increased from 1990 until 1997 
to reach a stable level until 2001; as of 2002 the delistings outnumber new listings. The 
authors find a value premium in all years for US listings, but not for UK listings on the main 
market. Noteworthy is also the finding that delistings as of 2002 are not driven by Sarbanes-
Oxley act, but by changes in firm characteristics. 
The stricter legal environment, greater disclosure requirements, and additional scrutiny 
that go with US or UK cross listings influence firms’ information environment. The empirical 
evidence of Lang et al. (2003a) indicates that non-US firms with a US exchange listing have 
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greater analyst coverage and increased analyst forecast accuracy. Baker et al. (2002) show 
that firms that cross list in the US or UK enhance their visibility, which these authors measure 
by the increase in media and analyst coverage. According to Fernandes and Ferreira (2008), 
the additional disclosure requirements and scrutiny enhances the price informativeness of 
firms with their primary listing in a developed market. However, the evidence of its 
consequences for accounting quality is mixed. Lang et al. (2003b) find that firms with a cross 
listing in the US are more conservative in reporting earnings than is a matched sample of non-
US firms without such a cross listing. This result also applies to UK firms with a cross listing 
in the US, which indicates that the US regime is stricter and more demanding than the UK 
regime (Huijgen and Lubberink, 2005). Nevertheless, despite the fact that all firms that cross 
list in the US are required to follow the same disclosure standards as US firms, Lang et al. 
(2006) find that the accounting data of cross-listed firms are of lower quality than US firms’ 
accounting data. The lower quality is even more apparent for cross-listed firms incorporated 
in countries with weaker investor protection.  
2.2. Forecast specificity and accuracy 
By disclosing earnings forecasts, managers can align investors’ expectations with their own 
expectations (Ajinkya and Gift, 1984; Hassell and Jennings, 1986). With hindsight, investors 
can assess whether the forecast was credible by comparing the forecasted earnings with the 
actual earnings. In the case of ex post forecast errors, investors might believe that managers 
disclosed a misleading forecast, resulting in reputation damage and greater potential legal 
costs.  
Managers can adjust the probability of making forecast errors by optimally choosing 
their forecast specificity level, i.e., they can choose between point, range, open-ended (both 
minimum and maximum), and qualitative forecasts. Less precise forecasts decrease the 
likelihood of making forecast errors (Skinner, 1994; Bamber and Cheon, 1998). Empirical 
evidence shows that firms in a more litigious environment disclose forecasts less often, and 
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that their forecasts are less precise and have smaller forecast horizons compared to firms in 
less litigious environments (Baginski et al., 2002; Frost, 2004).  
Forecast accuracy and conservatism concern the ex post reliability of management 
forecasts. Previous US studies show that, on average, actual earnings fall short of earnings 
forecasts.3
3. Hypotheses 
 Several other studies provide evidence that the legal environment influences firms’ 
disclosure incentives. Skinner (1994) and Kasznik and Lev (1995) find that firms that 
experience a large drop in share price around an earnings announcement face a greater 
litigation threat. With respect to disclosing forward-looking information, Francis et al. (1994) 
show that shareholders are not likely to sue firms that disclose pessimistic earnings forecasts 
or fail to disclose favourable earnings forecasts. Rogers and Stocken (2005) find that when 
managers of US firms face a higher litigation threat, they release less optimistic forecasts 
(Rogers and Stocken, 2005). For UK firms, Steele (1982) reports that non-quantified forecasts 
reduce uncertainty about future earnings. Steele finds that the least biased forecasts are 
predictions of an earnings decrease. Brennan (2000) finds that actual results are correct or 
exceed management forecasts disclosed by UK takeover bidders. 
We expect to find that cross-listed firms have more exposure to potential legal-liability costs, 
which can bring about incentives to disclose less precise forecasts. In a similar vein, the 
additional scrutiny and monitoring by financial intermediaries decreases the likelihood that 
managers exercise discretion in their forecast decisions. Thus, our first hypothesis is: (H1): 
Firms with a cross listing in the US or UK disclose less precise forecasts. 
                                                 
3 See for example Pownall et al. (1993), Bamber and Cheon (1998), and Irani (2001). However, McNichols 
(1989) finds optimism in only one year in the period 1979-1983 and Cao et al. (2006) find optimism only in 
ambiguous cash flow forecasts.  
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We expect to find that Dutch firms with a cross listing in the US or UK that release 
inaccurate forecasts not only experience a stronger litigation threat, but also higher reputation 
costs, which would provide these firms’ managers with incentives to avoid misleading 
investors. Firms mitigate the probability of misleading investors by making fewer and smaller 
forecast errors. We also expect that Dutch firms with a cross listing in the US or UK make 
more conservative earnings forecasts and smaller forecast errors than do firms without such a 
cross listing. We define more conservative forecasts as forecasts that are less optimistic. These 
assumptions lead to the following two hypotheses: (H2): The forecast error is smaller for 
firms cross-listed in the US or UK; and (H3): The forecast errors are more conservative for 
firms cross-listed in the US or UK.  
From our three hypotheses on the specificity and accuracy of forecasts by cross-listed 
firms, it can be derived that cross listings can have negative effects (lower precision) and 
positive effects (smaller errors and conservatism) on the informativeness of forecasts. The 
obvious analysis to investigate the potential wealth effects of forecasts is to examine the price 
reaction by shareholders on the firm’s announcements. The latter will indicate the anticipated 
wealth effect of the news. Several studies report significant abnormal returns surrounding 
management forecasts (e.g. Ajinkya and Gift, 1984; Waymire, 1984; McNichols, 1989; 
Pownall et al., 1993; Skinner, 1994; Hutton et al., 2003; Rogers and Stocken, 2005). We 
argue that managers take into account potential litigation costs, while investors, on their part, 
also take into account potential litigation costs of firms disclosing forecasts. We expect that 
the market response will be more positive for cross-listed firms, because of the higher 
potential litigation effects in case managers present news that is disappointing to shareholders. 
As a null-hypothesis we start with this positive effect of cross-listings, which has been 
documented in the empirical literature: (H4): Management forecasts have higher abnormal 
returns for firms cross-listed in the US or UK. 
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4. Forward-looking disclosure requirements in the Netherlands, US, and UK 
Because we analyse management forecasts disclosed by Dutch firms, in this section we 
describe the relevant requirements for forward-looking disclosures in the Netherlands, the US, 
and the UK. We study Dutch firms in the period 1997-2001 mainly for the following reasons. 
First, before 1997 the number of Dutch cross-listing in the US and UK has been increasing to 
reach a stable level of about 20%, hence we would have an insufficiently large sample prior to 
this year (for trends in US and UK listings, see Doidge et al., 2009). Second, after 2001 the 
number of cross delistings exceeds the new cross listings both in the US and the UK (Doidge 
et al., 2009), which would also decrease our sample size. Thus, we are investigating the 
effects of Dutch cross listings in the years in which these listings are most prevalent.  
According to Dutch law, firms are not required to disclose earnings forecasts. Section 
391, subsection 2, book II of the Civil Code states that firms should write a statement in their 
annual reports concerning their business outlook. Unless there are compelling reasons for not 
doing so, firms should pay particular attention to investments, financing, and personnel, and to 
the circumstances that affect future turnover and profitability. In addition, the Dutch 
Accounting Standards Board (Raad voor de Jaarverslaggeving) issues non-compulsory 
guidelines for financial reporting. Guideline 4.01.108 requires firms to provide statements 
regarding information on investments, financing, personnel, and the circumstances that affect 
future turnover and profitability (Dutch Accounting Standards Board, 2005). 
The listing rules on the Dutch Stock Exchange, Euronext Amsterdam, include the 
recommendation that firms announce their expected turnover or results. Euronext also 
requires listed firms to immediately announce publicly, via a press release, ‘every fact or 
circumstance which is assumed to have significant influence on the share price’ (article 28h 
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Listing Requirements).4 If there is a case of malpractice, then Euronext can give a warning or 
a serious warning to the firm. Moreover, investors can start a civil lawsuit against firms and 
charge them on the basis of committing a wrongful act. If there is a case of serious 
misrepresentation, then investors can also appeal at the Enterprise Chamber 
(Ondernemingskamer), which is a special court and part of the Amsterdam court of law 
(Klaassen and Schreuder, 1980).5
In the US, Form 10-K, which is a firm's annual report, provides forward-looking 
information. This forward-looking information was made pursuant to the safe harbor 
provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, implying that this 
information is not a guarantee of future performance and involves certain risks and 
uncertainties, which are difficult to predict. Therefore, actual future results and trends may 
differ materially from what is forecasted in forward-looking statements. Despite the safe 
harbor rule, management can be exposed to penalties under the antifraud provisions of Section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5 if a plaintiff can establish 
that a management forecast was made with actual knowledge that it was false or misleading.  
 Given the legal requirements and the listing contract, most 
firms listed on Euronext Amsterdam voluntarily disclose earnings forecasts.  
The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is widely viewed as the most 
stringent and most insistent on full and accurate disclosure to protect investors (Saudagaran 
and Biddle, 1995; Frost, 2004). US exchange cross listings typically consist of Levels 2 and 3 
ADR programmes, which are the ADR issues connected with a listing on the AMEX or 
NYSE, or a quotation on the Nasdaq of either existing shares in the US (i.e., Level 2), or a US 
                                                 
4 As of October 1, 2005, this is referred to as article 47 of the Market abuse Act (Besluit Marktmisbruik) of the 
Autoriteit Financiële Markten, i.e., the Dutch Financial Markets Authority that is responsible for regulating 
behaviour on the financial markets in the Netherlands (Wet Toezicht Effectenverkeer, 2005). 
5 To appeal, investors must own at least €250,000 of the firm’s nominal capital or 10% of the firm’s shares. 
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public offering of the underlying shares (i.e., Level 3). Both Levels 2 and 3 require full SEC 
disclosure with Form 20-F. US cross-listed firms are exposed to legal liability under the US 
federal securities laws. 
 In the UK, The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSM Act) comprises a wide 
range of provisions concerning the regulation of financial markets and listing of firms in the 
UK.6 Under both the old Financial Services Act and the new FSM Act 2000, investors who 
suffer from incorrect or misleading statements can hold liable those persons that are 
responsible for listing particulars or prospectuses. The legal liability exposure of cross-listed 
firms depends on the market in which they are cross listed. We distinguish between the LSE 
and the Alternative Investment Market (AIM). Firms with a listing on the LSE must comply 
with the listing rules from the FSA. The FSA has published listing rules that contain detailed 
instructions for disclosing profit forecasts. If listed firms publish a forecast, they must either 
update or repeat the statement in the listing particulars (Section 81 FSM Act 2000). 
Particularly relevant for management forecasts is Section 47(2) of the Financial Services Act 
1986 (superseded by section 397 of the FSM Act 2000), which states that anyone who 
provides false or misleading information to the market, especially regarding the price or value 
of an investment, is guilty of an offence (Section 397(3), FSMA; formerly section 47(2), FSA 
1986). Apart from providing relevant information that is neither misleading nor inaccurate, it 
is a fundamental principle of the UK Listing Rules that the market should be informed without 
delay of all relevant information or any new developments that may affect the value of the 
securities.7
The Alternative Investment Market (AIM) is a sub-market of the LSE that has a more 
  
                                                 
6 http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/ukpga_20000008_en_1 
7 http://www.fsa.gov.uk 
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flexible regulatory system compared to the main market.8
Both the US and UK security markets distinguish a separate section of the market, the 
non-regulated over-the-counter (OTC) market. The unregistered transactions on both OTCs do 
not require the firm to meet the aforementioned specific disclosure and financial statement 
requirements. In the US, firms can trade Level 1 ADRs in an OTC market, where they have to 
meet a minimum amount of legal requirements.
 Firms listed on the AIM are not 
bound to the full disclosure and listing rules of the FSA, although AIM firms must also 
comply with the AIM Rules that contain extensive disclosure requirements. An AIM firm 
must take reasonable care to ensure that any information it conveys is not misleading, false, or 
deceptive, and that it does not omit anything likely to affect the import of such information 
(AIM Rule 10). Under the AIM rules, firms must also promptly issue a notification of price-
sensitive information which, if made public, would be likely to lead to a substantial movement 
in the price of its AIM securities (AIM Rule 11).  
9
Based on the description of the main characteristics of forward-looking disclosure 
requirements in the Netherlands, the US, and the UK, we expect to find differences in 
 For trading securities in a non-regulated UK 
market, such as in the International Order Book (IOB), the FSA leaves the legal responsibility 
with the home countries. Hence, the OTC markets in the US and the UK require less 
disclosure and are not subjected to the more stringent legal requirements that apply to main 
markets.  
                                                 
8 The AIM, which replaced the Unlisted Securities Market (USM) in June 1995, is regulated by the London 
Stock Exchange (LSE). 
9 In the US, OTC listings can be on the Bulletin Board or Pink Sheet. On January 4, 1999 the SEC approved an 
eligibility rule as an amendment to NASD rules 6530 and 6540, which stipulates that Bulletin Board firms have 
to file annual and current reports, as US exchange listed firms. The implementation schedule allowed firms with 
a Bulletin Board listing between 6 and 18 months to start filing with the SEC. See for example Bushee and Leuz 
(2005), who investigate the effects of these new disclosure requirements. 
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management forecasts by Dutch firms that depend  on whether the firms  are cross listed in the 
US or UK, since these cross-listed firms expose themselves to stricter legal and regulatory 
regimes.  
For our empirical analysis, we make the following distinctions.  First, we differentiate 
between exchange cross listings and OTC listings, since the latter have less-specific disclosure 
requirements. Therefore, cross-listings on the US or the UK OTC market are likely to have a 
weaker impact on management forecasts compared to exchange listings. Coffee (2002) argues 
that in spite of not exposing themselves to stricter legal requirements, OTC-listed firms still 
bond themselves by their presence in the market, although to a lesser extent than exchange-
listed firms. Moreover, and similar to exchange-listed firms, OTC-listed firms experience the 
additional scrutiny by ‘reputational intermediaries’.  
Second, the listing and disclosure requirements in the US are more stringent in 
comparison to the UK (Saudagaran and Biddle, 1995). Consistent with this distinction, 
Bianconi and Tan (2008) find that US listings are more valuable than UK listings. Therefore, 
we expect cross listings in the US to have a stronger impact on forecast decisions than UK 
cross listings, and that the impact of an exchange cross listing outweighs the impact of an 
OTC cross listing.  
5. Data and variables 
5.1. Data 
We obtain management forecasts for the period from 1997 until 2001, which we collect from 
the press releases disclosed by 193 firms listed on Euronext Amsterdam. We perform a 
keyword search and read the title of each press release. We consider each press release that 
includes a forecast that is attributable to the management of the forecasting firm. We find that 
180 firms issued at least one forecast. We include all annual forecasts of EPS, net income, 
EBIT, EBITA, EBITDA, and sales that firms disclosed between the start of the fiscal year and 
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the annual earnings announcement. We remove three firms from the sample because they 
have no annual forecasts. If one press release contains multiple management forecasts, we 
record all of them. Further, we analyze forecast specificity levels, i.e., point, range, open-
ended, and qualitative forecasts. This procedure provides us with a sample of 2,951 
management forecasts disclosed in 2,014 press releases by 177 firms.  
Throughout this paper our level of analysis is the press release. If a press release 
contains more than one forecast for the same period, we select a forecast using the following 
ordering: EPS, net income, EBIT, EBITA, EBITDA, and sales. In 46 press releases, firms 
disclose a preannouncement for the current year and an initial forecast for the next year. Since 
both forecasts apply to different fiscal years, we treat these forecasts as two observations. Our 
results do not change if we include only the preannouncements or only the initial forecasts.  
For each firm we obtain information on cross listings from the yearly Gids bij de 
Officiële Prijscourant. We obtain accounting data from the REACH database (Review and 
Analysis of Companies in Holland) and WorldScope. We first extract prior-period results and 
final results from press releases. For the results that firms do not report in press releases, we 
use REACH or WorldScope. We derive analyst information from IBES and stock returns 
from Datastream. We obtain ownership data from yearly handbooks of Dutch listed firms 
(Handboek Nederlandse Beursfondsen).  
5.2. Variables 
Table 1 provides an overview of the definitions and sources of our cross-listing dummies and 
our forecast specificity classification variables, and also defines the other variables in our 
study.  
We use a dummy variable Cross listing in US or UK, which takes the value of one 
when firms are cross listed in the US and/or the UK, and zero otherwise. As noted earlier, we 
expect that cross listings in the US have a stronger impact on forecast decisions than UK cross 
listings, and that the impact of an exchange cross listing outweighs the impact of an OTC 
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cross listing. Based on these differences, we define four additional dummy variables. First, we 
define the dummy variable US Exchange listing to have a value of one when the firm has an 
ADR 2 or 3 listing in the US, and zero otherwise. Second, we assign a value of one to the 
dummy variable UK Exchange listing when the firm is listed in the UK on the LSE or AIM 
market but does not have a US exchange cross listing, and zero otherwise. Third, the dummy 
US OTC listing has a value of one if the firm has a Level 1 ADR listing but does not have a 
UK exchange listing, and zero otherwise.10
 
 Fourth, the dummy UK OTC listing has a value of 
one if a firm is listed on the OTC market in the UK but has no other cross listings in the UK 
or US, and zero otherwise.  
[Please insert Table 1 here] 
 
When defining the variable Specificity type, we must account for the Mock Scale, 
which is a unique feature of the Dutch setting. In 1984, Dutch investor relations advisor Harry 
Mock defined a scale of qualitative words and corresponding percentages. Within several 
years after its publication, the scale became a generally accepted standard in the Netherlands 
(Algemeen Dagblad of 29 March 1997 and Het Financieele Dagblad of 28 August 1999). 
CFOs, investor relations managers, analysts, and investors use the scale to translate adjectives 
into percentages. An English version of the scale appeared in 1997 (Mock, 1999).  
The Mock Scale consists of eight qualitative statements, such as ‘limited’ and 
‘significant’, and allocates exact percentages to these statements. Appendix 1 shows the Mock 
Scale. For example, according to the Mock Scale, a prediction of ‘significantly’ higher net 
                                                 
10 The sample of US OTC firms includes all Pink Sheet quotations. Because during our research window 
regulations have changed for Bulletin Board firms, in which the implementation schedule allowed different 
transition dates, we have chosen to trace actual filings with the SEC. We define Bulletin Board firms as OTC 
firms, until they file Form 20-F’s with the SEC. As of this date, the firms are considered exchange-listed. 
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earnings is equivalent to a forecast of an earnings increase of 12 to 20%. An investor who is 
not aware of the Mock Scale would interpret this adjective as an open-ended forecast 
predicting that the firm's earnings will be higher. However, Dutch investors know that 
managers are likely to refer to the Mock Scale and that they will interpret the prediction as a 
range forecast in which the earnings will increase 12% to 20%.  
Applying the Mock Scale can alter the specificity of forecasts in two ways: it may turn 
an open-ended forecast into a range forecast; or open-ended forecasts remain open-ended, but 
become more informative. For example, ‘a modest increase’ in EPS relative to last year’s EPS 
would normally mean an open-ended minimum forecast (i.e., a minimum increase with last 
year’s EPS as lower bound), but if the investor applies the Mock Scale, then the open-ended 
forecast converts into a range forecast, indicating a 2% to 4% increase relative to last year’s 
EPS. Alternatively, ‘a sharp increase’ in EPS relative to last year’s EPS is an open-ended 
forecast, regardless of applying the Mock Scale (i.e., last year’s EPS as lower bound of the 
forecast and an increase of more than 45% relative to last year’s EPS). In all instances, the 
inclusion of Mock interpretations makes forecasts more informative. At the same time, the use 
of Mock Scale words is less informative than explicitly mentioning the percentages related to 
the words. As we order the variable Specificity type on informativeness, it takes a value of one 
for qualitative forecasts, two for open-ended forecasts (minimum and maximum), three for 
open-ended forecasts that include words from the Mock Scale, four for range forecasts that 
include words from the Mock Scale, five for range forecasts, and six for point forecasts. 11
                                                 
11 We find that nine firms explicitly refer to the Mock Scale in 44 forecasts. In our analysis we consider forecasts 
with the qualitative Mock adjectives and without any reference to the Mock Scale as a separate group. It is not 
clear whether the forecasts where managers explicitly refer to the scale of Mock must be divided into this 
separate group of Mock forecasts or into the group range forecasts, as the percentage increase/decrease in 
predicted earnings is already established by explicitly referring to the Mock scale. Therefore, we exclude these 
observations. 
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The requirement that all information on firm and forecast characteristics should be 
available reduces our sample by 98 press releases. Our sample also has one firm with an 
extreme value in its earnings variance (i.e., earnings variance equals 119.6) and four firms 
with an extreme Tobin’s q in a forecast year (i.e., a Tobin’s q greater than 7, which is a 
deviation of more than four standard deviations from the average Tobin’s q). We exclude 20 
press releases for which we observe the extreme values. After excluding these observations, 
our final sample consists of 2,781 forecasts disclosed in 1,896 press releases by 168 firms. 
6. Results for forecast specificity and accuracy 
6.1. Statistics 
Table 2 shows the distribution of the number of forecasting firms per type of cross listing. We 
note that because 11 out of the 168 firms change their type of cross listing during our sample 
period, this table provides the cross-listing status of firms only when they first occur in the 
sample period. 
 
[Please insert Table 2 here] 
 
Out of the 168 firms in our sample, 36 firms have a cross listing. Sixteen firms are exchange 
listed in the US. Eight of these US-exchange-listed firms are also listed in the UK. Six of 
these firms have a UK exchange listing and two others have a UK OTC listing (not tabulated). 
Our sample includes another two firms with a UK exchange listing, 11 firms with only a US 
OTC listing, and seven with only a UK OTC listing. 
The distribution of press releases with management forecasts per type of cross listing 
shows a slightly higher percentage (26.3%) of press releases disclosed by cross-listed firms 
relative to the percentage (21.4%) of cross-listed firms in our sample. This finding implies 
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that cross-listed firms use relatively more press releases with forecasts than do non-cross-
listed firms.  
Panel A of Table 3 provides statistics per press release for the samples of firms with 
and without cross listings.  
 
[Please insert Table 3 here] 
 
On average, non-cross-listed firms disclose 1.453 forecasts in each press release. We note that 
the average number of forecasts is higher than one, because some firms disclose more than 
one forecast in a press release. For instance, if a firm discloses an EBIT forecast and an EPS 
forecast, we count two forecasts. 
Firms in our sample often use the Mock Scale. On average, each press release contains 
0.21 forecasts with a word from the scale. This result indicates that firms use a Mock 
adjective in about one out of seven forecasts. The forecast horizons are similar for cross-listed 
and non-cross-listed firms, about 170 days before the firm’s fiscal year end. Information on 
firm size and number of analysts show that cross-listed firms are larger than other firms and 
have greater analyst coverage. The median number of analysts that follow a firm is 38 for 
cross-listed firms and only nine for the firms without a US or UK listing. The average Tobin's 
q of 1.7 and 1.6, respectively, indicates that the Tobin's q’s do not differ strongly between the 
two samples. On average, the cross-listed firms have lower blockholdings, 25% compared to 
40% for the other firms. Panel A also shows that the earnings variability and the fraction of 
firms with a declining earnings trend do not differ strongly between the two samples. The 
announcement effects of the cross-listed firms are on average -1.3%, whereas the average in 
the other sample is -0.4%. It should be noted that these results are based on slighter smaller 
samples, because we removed outliers (observations with values more than four times the 
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standard devation different from the mean). We will discuss these effects in more detail in 
Section 7. 
Panel B of Table 3 shows the frequencies of forecast characteristics in the press 
releases. The highest degree of forecast specificity is a point forecast, which is issued in 29% 
of the press releases of firms without a cross listing and 24% of the press releases of cross-
listed firms. We do not find strong differences in specificity in the bivariate analysis. Our 
observations are almost evenly split between good and bad news for both sets of firms. 
We also find that 35% of the forecasts from non-cross-listed firms are initial forecasts, 
56% are revisions, and 9% are preannouncements. Cross-listed firms disclose initial forecasts 
less often than do non-cross-listed firms, but provide updates more often in terms of 
maintaining or revising their previous forecasts. This result might explain the relatively larger 
number of press releases with forecasts disclosed by cross-listed firms relative to non-cross-
listed firms. Potential litigation costs and greater scrutiny can induce these firms to disclose 
updates more often. In untabulated analyses we split the sample of cross-listed firms into the 
four different types of cross listings. We find that in 67% of all cross listings, US exchange-
listed firms disclose most updates, and 56% of UK OTC-listed firms disclose the least 
updates.  
6.2. Determinants of forecast specificity 
Table 4 reports summary statistics of the explanatory variables for the full sample and by 
forecast specificity type. The results show that cross-listed firms disclose relatively more 
range, open-ended, and qualitative forecasts than point and Mock (open-ended and range) 
forecasts.  
 
[Please insert Table 4 here] 
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The distribution is similar in all four groups of cross-listed firms. Range forecasts occur most 
frequently among US exchange-listed firms, followed by UK exchange-listed firms and UK 
OTC-listed firms.  
We also see that firms disclosing preannouncements provide the most precise 
forecasts, followed by firms that revise or maintain their previous forecast. Firms that release 
an initial forecast disclose the least precise forecasts. This finding is consistent with Baginski 
and Hassell’s (1997) result that more precise forecasts tend to be issued later in the period. 
The average forecast horizon is 170 days, indicating that firms disclose their average forecast 
during the third quarter of the fiscal year. Consistent with more uncertainty earlier in the fiscal 
year, the average forecast horizon appears to be longer for less specific forecasts: 216 days for 
qualitative forecasts decreases to 104 days for point forecasts. 
We do not find any pattern in the relations between the sign of the news or firm size 
and specificity. Firms that disclose range-Mock forecasts have a remarkably higher Tobin’s q 
than do firms that disclose other forecast specificity types. Firms that disclose range forecasts 
have higher average analyst coverage compared to firms that disclose point, open-ended, or 
qualitative forecasts. The relation between block holdings and forecast specificity is most 
evident in the open-ended-Mock, range-Mock, and qualitative forecasts, in which the average 
block holding is greater than 40%, compared to 36% in the full sample. Earnings variance and 
declining earnings trends are both lowest for Mock-range forecasts.  
To test our hypotheses, we use a multivariate setting to examine the factors that might 
influence managers’ choice for forecast specificity. Since the forecast specificity type is an 
ordinal variable, we estimate an ordered-response probit regression. The model is defined as: 
 
g(Pr[Specificity < i | X]) = αi + β1 Cross listing US/UK + β2 Initial forecast + β3 
Revision/maintenance + β4 Horizon + β5 Sign of news + β6 Ln(Firm size) + β7 Tobin’s q + β8 
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Analyst following + β9 Percentage block shareholders + β10 Earnings variance + β11 Declining 
earnings trend + γ1..5 Year + ϕ1..7 Industry + εi        (1) 
 
The dependent variable Specificity is in ascending order of forecast specificity and X 
constitutes the vector of independent values discussed in the previous section. The forecast 
specificity probit estimation fits the probability that the forecast is from forecast specificity 
type category i or lower, given the vector of explanatory variables. A positive (negative) 
coefficient indicates that higher values of the independent variables are associated with more 
(less) specific forecasts. We base the industry groups on the major groups of the two-digit SIC 
industry codes. We estimate five different regression specifications and present the results in 
Table 5. 
  
[Please insert Table 5 here] 
 
We estimate equation (1) for the full sample of forecasts with and without an indicator 
variable for cross-listed firms in regression models (1) and (2), respectively. Model (1) 
indicates that managers provide more precise forecasts when they receive new information. A 
revision or maintenance of previous forecasts and initial forecasts are significantly less precise 
compared to preannouncements. The results also show that a longer forecast horizon results in 
far less specific forecasts.  
The results from Table 5 also show that firm size is positively related with forecast 
specificity, indicating that larger firms disclose more precise forecasts. Because firm size is 
highly correlated with analyst coverage (0.86), we first orthogonalise analyst coverage on firm 
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size.12
Model (2) tests our first hypothesis, which states that firms with a cross listing in the 
US or UK disclose less precise forecasts. In line with our first hypothesis, the variable cross 
listing has a negative relation with forecast specificity. We further investigate H1 in models 
(3) to (5), in which we differentiate between exchange listings and OTC listings in the US and 
UK. In all three models, we use the same sample of non-cross-listed firms as a basis. We add 
one specific type of cross listing per model: in model (3) we add firms with a US exchange 
listing, in model (4) we add the sample of firms with a US OTC listing, and in model (5) we 
add firms with a UK OTC listing. Due to the low number of observations for UK exchange-
listed firms (see Table 2), we do not estimate the regression for this subsample.  
 This method makes it possible for us to examine the impact of analyst coverage in 
addition to firm size. The results indicate that analyst following does add to the effect of firm 
size on forecast specificity. The coefficient of orthogonalised analysts yields a small negative 
effect on specificity. We find no significant coefficients for the sign of the news, q, 
blockholders, earnings variance, and the earnings trend. 
Our results indicate that in each alternative specification, cross-listed firms provide 
less precise forecasts. Firms with a listing on a US stock exchange, firms with an OTC listing 
in the US, and firms with an OTC listing in the UK appear to have incentives to disclose less 
precise information.13
                                                 
12 In particular, we first regress analyst coverage on firm size. Second, we use the difference between the fitted 
and actual values of this regression (the residuals) as a new measure of analyst coverage. By construction, the 
new measure is uncorrelated with firm size. It should be noted that this approach alters the interpretation of the 
coefficients of firm size and analyst coverage in Table 5. We fully attribute the size effect in analyst coverage to 
the size variable. In other words, the new measure for analyst coverage captures the coverage in excess of the 
part explained by firm size.  
 As noted earlier, forecasts that are less precise will decrease the 
13 A regression for non-cross-listed firms and firms with a UK listing, independent of whether the firm is also 
listed in the US, provides a negative, but nonsignificant, cross-listing coefficient that equals -0.242, and a p-value 
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likelihood of investors being misled. Since legal bonding is more likely to apply to firms with 
an exchange listing and reputational bonding applies to both OTC and exchange listings, our 
results suggest that reputational bonding is relevant in our sample. If our results had mainly 
been driven by greater legal liability exposure, as associated with legal bonding, we would 
have expected to find a different effect for exchange and OTC listings.  
6.3. Accuracy of management forecasts 
We calculate the management forecast errors as follows: 
earningsForecasted
earningsForecastedearningsActualerrorforecastManagement −=   (2) 
 
A positive forecast error indicates that the forecast underestimates actual earnings. Similar to 
forecast specificity, we assume that managers are familiar with the Mock Scale. Hence, we 
use the percentages equal to the scale to calculate the forecasted amount of range-Mock 
forecasts and open-ended-Mock forecasts. When a range forecast is incorrect, we take the 
lower (upper) bound of the minimum (maximum) forecasted amount as forecast value.  
Our forecast error analysis is based on a sample of 1,756 press releases instead of 
1,896 press releases because it is not possible to calculate forecast errors for the 110 
qualitative forecasts. In addition, we have missing values for 22 forecasts and we exclude 
eight forecasts with extreme forecast errors for which values deviate more than four standard 
deviations from the average forecast errors. Table 6 projects the frequencies of observations 
with no forecast errors, overestimated forecasts, and underestimated forecasts for the full 
sample and per forecast specificity type. We present a Pearson χ2 statistic (and p-value) in 
                                                                                                                                                         
of 0.12. However, the two firms that are only listed in the UK drive this nonsignificant result. When we exclude 
these two firms from the regression, we find a negative and significant cross-listing coefficient of -0.415, and a 
p-value of 0.018.  
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order to test the null hypothesis that the distributions for cross-listed and non-cross-listed 
firms are independent.  
 
[Please insert Table 6 here] 
 
The results for the full sample show that non-cross-listed firms disclose forecasts that are 
correct in 51% of the cases. In 21% of the cases, the forecasts overestimate realisations, and in 
28% of the forecasts we find an underestimation. For cross-listed firms, the statistics are 
similar, at 50%, 22%, and 28%, respectively. In both groups, the percentage of 
underestimations is higher than overestimations for most forecast specificity types. The χ2 of 
0.228, with a p-value of 0.892 indicates that the null hypothesis of independence cannot be 
rejected. In other words, the distribution over the three forecast error classes does not differ 
significantly between cross-listed and other firms. We note that most open-ended forecasts are 
minimum forecasts; managers can only overestimate earnings if they release minimum 
forecasts.  
The distribution of range forecasts indicates that the probability that cross-listed firms 
will overestimate earnings is lower than that of non-cross-listed firms. Sixteen percent of the 
range forecasts by cross-listed firms are overestimations, compared to 31% of the range 
forecasts by non-cross-listed firms. In this sub-sample, the χ2 test rejects the hypothesis of 
independence, at the 1% significance level. The point forecasts show a slightly different 
picture. Even though both cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms show that they are 
conservative by underestimating future earnings more often, cross-listed firms disclose more 
overestimations (36%) than do non-cross-listed firms (26%).   
Table 7 shows the magnitude of the forecast errors for the sample of firms with and 
without a cross listing. In addition, we split the forecasts into a group of overestimations and 
underestimations and provide the p-values for the difference in forecast errors between cross-
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listed and non-cross-listed firms. We exclude the open-ended-Mock forecasts from the table, 
because the number of observations is not sufficient to make comparisons.  
 
[Please insert Table 7 here] 
 
The results suggest that at -3.1%, the mean forecast error of cross-listed firms is smaller and 
more conservative than that of non-cross-listed firms (-10.6%, p-value of difference equals 
0.012). Non-cross-listed firms overestimate earnings by 7.5% more than do their cross-listed 
peers. The smaller difference between the forecast and outcome is particularly apparent for 
the subsample of overestimations. We consider this finding as evidence that cross-listed firms 
are more conservative compared to non-cross-listed firms. 
Because the lower forecast errors of cross-listed firms may be caused by their less 
precise forecasts, Table 7 also provides the forecast errors per specificity type. Our results 
remain robust. The forecast error of non-cross-listed firms is larger than that of cross-listed 
firms for all specificity types. The findings accord with the premise that a stricter legal 
environment and greater scrutiny and monitoring induce firms to become more conservative 
in their forecasts and make smaller forecast errors. 
7. Results for shareholder wealth effects 
The outcomes of the analyses for specificity and accuracy are indecisive with respect to the 
effects of cross listings, because forecasts become less specific on the one hand and more 
accurate on the other hand. In order to determine the net effect, from the perspective of 
financial markets, we conduct an event study analysis in which we measure the cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) over three days around the forecast via the market model as 
described by MacKinlay (1997). The estimation period starts 120 days prior to the forecast 
until 20 days prior to the forecast. We use the market index of Euronext Amsterdam to 
estimate the market returns. The results are presented in Table 8.  
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[Please insert Table 8 here] 
 
In Panel A we describe the CARs for the sub samples. For the sample of firms without a cross 
listing the average effect is -0.04%. Interestingly, the US exchange-listed firms show an 
average positive CAR of 0.31%. The UK exchange-listed firms yield a small sample of 16 
announcements, with a negative return of -2.52% on average. The OTC listings are negative 
both for the US and UK, respectively -0.78% and -0.32%. In all sub samples we find 
relatively high standard deviations, which indicate a large variation in the CARs. In 
subsequent regression analysis, we aim to exploit this variation. 
 In Panel B we perform an OLS regression explaining the three-day CARs by a set of 
control variables and cross-listing indicators. In each regression we include indicators for 
years and industries (results not reported). In model (1) we introduce a set of control variables, 
based on existing literature. First, we include initial forecasts and revision/maintenance 
dummy variable, while omitting preannouncements, because the phase in the timeline is found 
to influence the market response towards earnings forecasts. The abnormal returns are 
significantly larger for revisions than for initial forecasts (Pownall et al., 1993). Managers 
possess most information during the last phase of the timeline, i.e. when they release a 
preliminary earnings estimate. Baginski et al. (1994) document significantly negative 
abnormal returns associated with preannouncements. The high certainty level makes these 
forecasts more credible than the first two phases in the timeline. Second, we include the 
forecast horizon, because a longer horizon leads to more uncertainty about future earnings, 
indicating that investors perceive forecasts as less credible when disclosed earlier in the fiscal 
year. Third, we control for firm size, number of analyst following and blockholding as 
measures for the information asymmetry between firms and investors (Lang et al., 2003a). 
Investors may therefore better anticipate the information released in management forecasts by 
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firms with greater analysts following and blockholdings, while larger firms may be more 
complex and less transparent. Fourth, firms with higher growth opportunities experience 
higher proprietary information costs when releasing management forecasts. Gigler (1994) 
provides evidence that investors conceive the release of proprietary information as more 
credible. Hence, we expect that the market reaction is stronger towards forecasts from firms 
with higher growth opportunities. Fifth, investors respond stronger to forecasts with a higher 
unexpected component (see Ajinkya and Gift, 1984; Waymire, 1984; Skinner, 1994) and they 
have more difficulties predicting future earnings when earnings are more volatile. As a result, 
the unexpected component of forecasts increases with the firms’ earnings volatility and hence 
magnifies the market response. Finally, we include a measure for declining earnings trends. 
We find that the two timeline variables have negative effects, whereas the coefficients 
are measured relative to preannouncements. This implies that earlier announcements have 
more negative effects. Longer forecasts horizons are appreciated by investors, as horizon has a 
significantly positive effect on the CARs. Larger firms tend to have more negative effects and 
blockholders positively influence the returns. Finally, a declining earnings trend with a 
management forecast induces a reduction in stock prices. The fit of the model is acceptable, 
given the R2 of 9.89%. 
 In model (2) we add four indicator variables for cross listing and thus compare the 
announcement effects of cross-listed firms with non-cross-listed peers. We find that the 
coefficient for US exchange listings is positive and significant at the 1% level. Furthermore, 
the economic effect is also meaningful: US-listed firms have 2.7% higher announcement 
returns, after controlling for other firm and forecast characteristics. The indicators for other 
cross listings do not yield significant effects. 
 From the analysis of forecast specificity and accuracy we learn that firm disclosure 
policies are affected by cross listings. Therefore, in model (3) we control for specificity and 
accuracy. We have to omit a set of observations with qualitative forecasts, because we cannot 
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measure the accuracy of these announcements. The benchmark for specificity is the point 
forecast. We find that all four specificity indicators yield negative coefficients, while three out 
of four are significant. This result implies that investors find point forecasts more valuable 
than other announcements. We also find that investors do not react based on the (anticipated) 
forecast error. Our results demonstrate that our control for specificity is relevant, because 
cross-listed firms both have less specific forecasts and higher announcement effects. Given 
this result, it is important to notice that the positive effect of a US listing remains unaffected. 
This result demonstrates that the overall effect on the value of the information provided is 
positive, despite the fact that managers of Dutch firms with a cross listing in the US present 
less specific (but more accurate) forecasts, .  
8. Conclusion 
 In this study we analyse the influence of cross listings in the UK or US on the characteristics 
of management earnings forecasts by Dutch firms. Because the UK and the US have higher 
regulatory disclosure and stricter enforcement rules regimes than the Netherlands, Dutch firms 
that cross list in these countries voluntarily expose themselves to these stricter regimes. In 
addition, these cross listings also lead to greater scrutiny and monitoring by financial 
intermediaries.  
By using these cross listings on forecast specificity and ex post forecast errors, the 
relatively large number (21%) of Dutch firms with a cross listing provides a unique setting in 
which to study the impact of stricter legal regimes and enhanced scrutiny. Our empirical 
results show that cross-listed firms disclose less specific forecasts; the average forecast error 
of firms with a cross listing is lower than that of non-cross-listed firms; and that cross-listed 
firms are more conservative (i.e., less optimistic) in their forecasts than are non-cross-listed 
firms. In addition, we find that management forecasts by firm listed on US exchanges have 
significantly higher announcement returns. 
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To determine the consequences of these results for disclosure policies, we demonstrate 
that managers of Dutch cross-listed firms exhibit lower specificity in their forecasts. 
Additionally, their forecasts errors are smaller and more conservative. The reduced specificity 
and the conservatism bias make the forecasts less informative about the management’s 
predictions of future profits, while the smaller forecast errors have the opposite effect. In all, 
we conclude from our empirical analyses that a firm's management anticipates legal and 
reputational penalties and adjusts their forecasts accordingly. Because we find that financial 
markets react positively to the management’s anticipation, we conclude that the net effect of 
cross listing (i.e. bonding) is  positive.  
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Appendix 1: The frequency of the use of words from the Mock Scale  
 
Qualitative words % increase 
or decrease 
      
Dutch English N   Percentage 
Fractioneel Marginal 0 - 2% 0  0% 
Gering Modest  2 - 4% 15  4% 
Licht Limited 4 - 7% 40 + 10% 
Duidelijk Marked 7 - 12% 59 ++ 16% 
Belangrijk Significant  12 - 20% 107  28% 
Sterk Strong  20 - 30% 52  17% 
Aanzienlijk Considerable  30 - 45% 59  15% 
Fors Sharp  45% or more 34  10% 
Total     366   100% 
      
+  Including two forecasts in which a firm mentions ‘between modest and limited’  
++ Including one forecast in which a firm mentions ‘between limited and marked’ 
 36 
Table 1 
Explanation of variables 
 
Variable Explanation 
Cross listing in US or UK  Dummy variable equals one when the firm has a cross listing in the US 
or UK, zero otherwise. With a cross listing, we refer to ADR Level 1, 
2, and 3 listings, LSE listings, AIM listings, and the UK OTC listings. 
Source: ‘Gids bij de Officiële Prijscourant 1997/1998-2001/2002’ 
US exchange listing Dummy equals one if the Dutch listed firm has an exchange cross 
listing in the US. With an exchange cross listing, we refer to the ADR 
2 and ADR 3 listings. If the firm has an exchange listing or OTC 
listing in the UK in addition to the exchange listing in the US, the 
dummy remains one. OTC Bulletin Board firms have a value of one as 
of the date of their SEC registration of an a Form 20-F. In all other 
cases, the dummy equals zero. Source: see cross listing in US and UK. 
UK exchange listing Dummy equals one if the Dutch listed firm has an exchange cross 
listing in the UK. With an exchange cross listing, we refer to a listing 
on LSE and AIM. If the firm also has an OTC listing in the US, the 
dummy remains one. However, if the firm also has an exchange listing 
in the US, the dummy becomes zero. In all other cases, the dummy 
equals zero. Source: see cross listing in US and UK. 
US OTC listing Dummy equals one if the Dutch listed firm has an OTC listing in the 
US via an ADR 1 listing. If the firm has an exchange listing in the UK, 
the dummy becomes zero. In all other cases, the dummy equals zero. 
Source: see cross-listing in US and UK. 
UK OTC listing Dummy equals one if the Dutch listed firm has an OTC listing in the 
UK. If the firm has an exchange listing or OTC listing in the US, the 
dummy becomes zero. In all other cases, the dummy equals zero. 
Source: see cross-listing in US and UK. 
Specificity type Forecast specificity type equals one for qualitative forecasts, two for 
open-ended forecasts, three for open-ended forecasts that contain 
Mock words, four for range forecasts with Mock words, five for the 
other range forecasts, and six for point forecasts.  
Management forecast error (Realised earnings - forecasted earnings)/absolute (forecasted 
earnings). We can only measure forecast errors of point, range, and 
open-ended forecasts. When an open-ended forecast is incorrect, we 
take the lower bound (upper bound) of the minimum (maximum) 
forecast as forecast value. Source: Press releases as provided by 
Euronext, Worldscope, and REACH. 
Declining earnings trend Dummy variable equals one when the firm's earnings decline in the 
year of the forecast relative to the previous year. The dummy equals 
zero otherwise. Source: Worldscope and REACH 
Earnings variability Variance of a firm's net income standardised by its market 
capitalisation over a period of four years prior to the fiscal year to 
which the forecast pertains. If the firm’s net income is not available for 
the previous four years, we move the period one year forward or use 
three years instead. Source: Worldscope and REACH 
 
Firm size Natural log of the beginning of the year market capitalisation. Source: 
Worldscope 
Horizon The number of days between the management forecast disclosure and 
the fiscal year end to which the forecast pertains. 
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Number of analysts following The number of analysts that follow a firm during the fiscal year of the 
forecast. Source: I/B/E/S. 
Cumulative abnormal return The cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over three days around the 
forecast via the market model as described by MacKinlay (1997). The 
estimation period starts 120 days prior to the forecast until 20 days 
prior to the forecast. We use the market index of Euronext Amsterdam 
to estimate the market returns. Source: Datastream 
Sign of the news Dummy variable that equals one if the forecast is good news and zero 
in case of bad news. As Baginski et al., 1994; Baginski and Hassell, 
1997), we classify news as good (bad) news when the cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) over three days around the forecast are 
positive (negative).  Source: Datastream 
 
Timeline of the forecast The timeline of the forecast equals one for initial forecasts, two for 
maintenance or revisions of previous forecasts, and three for 
preliminary earnings estimates. Preliminary earnings estimates are 
forecasts that firms disclose after the fiscal period end, but before the 
official disclosure of the annual results. 
Percentage block shareholders The total percentage of a firm's shares that outside shareholders hold in 
a block of at least five percent. We exclude block holdings of directors 
of the firm. Source: ‘Handboek Nederlandse Beursfondsen 1996-2002’ 
Tobin's q We use Tobin’s q as our proxy for a firm's growth opportunities. We 
calculate Tobin's q as the market value of a firm divided by the book 
value of the firm, as defined by Perfect and Wiles (1994). In the 
Netherlands, firms base the value of their assets either on its 
replacement value or on its historical costs. In case of the replacement 
value, no change is necessary. However, in case of historical costs, we 
adjust this value towards its replacement value as described in the 
study of De Jong (2002). Source: Worldscope and REACH. 
 
 38 
Table 2 
Distribution of cross-listed firms 
 
The table presents the number and percentage of firms and press releases per group of firms 
with and without a cross listing in the US or UK. We subdivide the cross-listings group into 
US exchange-listed firms, UK exchange-listed firms, US OTC-listed firms, and UK OTC-
listed firms. The percentages represent the percentage of (press releases from) the subsample 
of firms relative to the total number of (press releases from) firms in our sample. We report 
cross-listing status of firms when they first occur in the sample period. 
  Firms   Press releases 
  N (%)   N (%) 
Non-cross listed 132 (78.6%)  1398 (73.7%) 
      
Cross listed 36 (21.4%)  498 (26.3%) 
      
US exchange listing 16 (9.5%)  287 (15.1%) 
      
UK exchange listing 2 (1.2%)  16 (0.8%) 
      
US OTC listing 11 (6.5%)  106 (5.6%) 
      
UK OTC listing 7 (4.2%)  89 (4.7%) 
      
Total 168     1896   
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Table 3 
Descriptive statistics and distribution of management forecasts 
 
Panel A presents the mean, median, minimum, maximum, standard deviation, and the number 
of observations of the variables per press release for the sample of firms with cross listing in 
the US or UK, and for the sample of firms without such a cross listing. If press releases 
contain forecasts for two different timelines (e.g., initial forecast and preannouncement), we 
document both forecasts. Mock words are words from the Mock Scale as reported in 
Appendix 1. We provide full definitions of the variables in Table 1. For the cumulative 
abnormal returns we omit observations with returns that differ more than four standard 
deviations from the mean. In this table, Panel B provides the distribution of press releases 
with forecasts from cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms per forecast specificity group, 
message type, phase in the timeline, and sign of the news. 
 
Panel A: descriptive statistics per press release              
  Not cross listed   Cross listed 
 Mean St.dev. N  Mean St.dev. N 
  (Median)       (Median)     
Number of forecasts 1.453 0.670 1398  1.506 0.729 498 
 (1.000)    (1.000)   
Number of forecasts with Mock words 0.211 0.507 1398  0.143 0.428 498 
 (0.000)    (0.000)   
Forecast horizon 170 112 1398  171 107 498 
 (146)    (153)   
Firm size 18.683 1.521 1398  22.288 1.609 498 
 (18.737)    (22.580)   
Tobin's q 1.722 1.276 1398  1.648 0.922 498 
 (1.261)    (1.340)   
Number of analysts following 11.476 9.639 1398  34.974 13.407 498 
 (9.000)    (38.000)   
Percentage block shareholders 39.924 27.772 1398  24.877 17.596 498 
 (38.240)    (23.000)   
Earnings variability 0.029 0.187 1398  0.042 0.412 498 
 (0.001)    (0.000)   
Declining earnings trend 0.320 0.467 1398  0.329 0.470 498 
 (0.000)    (0.000)   
Cumulative abnormal returns -0.0004 0.075 1383  -0.0013 0.067 494 
  (0.0003)       (0.0025)     
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Table 3 (continued) 
Panel B: distribution per press release           
  Not cross listed   Cross listed 
  Observations (%)   Observations (%) 
Total amount 1398   498  
Forecast specificity      
Point 406 (29%)  119 (24%) 
Range 100 (7%)  69 (14%) 
Range Mock 188 (13%)  46 (9%) 
Open ended Mock 28 (2%)  7 (1%) 
Open ended  597 (43%)  226 (45%) 
Qualitative 79 (6%)  31 (6%) 
Total 1398 (100%)  498 (100%) 
Sign of the news      
Good news forecasts 695 (50%)  242 (49%) 
Bad news forecasts 703 (50%)  256 (51%) 
Total 1398 (100%)  498 (100%) 
Timeline of the forecast      
Initial management forecast 491 (35%)  146 (29%) 
Maintenance or revision 777 (56%)  316 (63%) 
Preliminary earnings estimate 130 (9%)  36 (7%) 
Total 1398 (100%)  498 (100%) 
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Table 4 
Descriptive statistics for forecast specificity choice 
 
This table presents the mean, median, and standard deviation of all explanatory variables in 
the forecast specificity regression for the total sample and per forecast specificity type. We 
provide full definitions of the variables in Table 1. The number of observations reflects the 
number of observations available per subsample. 
    Full 
sample 
Point Range Range   
Mock 
Open-
ended 
Mock 
Open 
ended  
Qualitative 
Cross listing in US/UK Mean 0.263 0.227 0.408 0.197 0.200 0.275 0.282 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 St.dev. 0.440 0.419 0.493 0.398 0.406 0.447 0.452 
         
- US exchange listing Mean 0.151 0.137 0.272 0.137 0.143 0.143 0.127 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 St.dev. 0.359 0.344 0.446 0.344 0.355 0.350 0.335 
         
- UK exchange listing Mean 0.008 0.006 0.047 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 St.dev. 0.091 0.075 0.213 0.000 0.000 0.078 0.000 
         
- US OTC listing Mean 0.056 0.053 0.030 0.034 0.000 0.070 0.064 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 St.dev. 0.230 0.225 0.170 0.182 0.000 0.256 0.245 
         
- UK OTC listing Mean 0.047 0.030 0.059 0.026 0.057 0.055 0.091 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 St.dev. 0.212 0.172 0.237 0.158 0.236 0.227 0.289 
         
Timeline: initial forecast Mean 0.336 0.185 0.207 0.274 0.314 0.454 0.509 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 St.dev. 0.472 0.388 0.406 0.447 0.471 0.498 0.502 
         
Timeline: 
revision/maintenance 
Mean 0.576 0.560 0.781 0.688 0.600 0.525 0.482 
Median 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 
 St.dev. 0.494 0.497 0.415 0.464 0.497 0.500 0.502 
         
Timeline: 
preannouncement 
Mean 0.088 0.255 0.012 0.038 0.086 0.021 0.009 
Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 St.dev. 0.283 0.436 0.108 0.193 0.284 0.142 0.095 
         
Forecast horizon Mean 170 104 173 176 141 204 216 
 Median 148 111 149 153 123 230 253 
 St.dev. 111 112 94 98 105 99 98 
         
Sign of the news Mean 0.506 0.501 0.408 0.594 0.400 0.513 0.473 
 Median 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
 St.dev. 0.500 0.500 0.493 0.492 0.497 0.500 0.502 
         
Ln(firm size) Mean 19.630 19.754 20.776 19.257 18.716 19.548 18.975 
 Median 19.454 19.674 20.387 18.928 17.676 19.337 18.540 
 St.dev. 2.214 2.034 2.301 1.998 2.341 2.233 2.479 
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Table 4 (continued) 
 
    Full 
sample 
Point Range Range   
Mock 
Open-
ended 
Mock 
Open 
ended  
Qualitative 
Tobin's q Mean 1.702 1.691 1.617 1.877 1.698 1.702 1.515 
 Median 1.297 1.324 1.127 1.386 1.104 1.296 1.350 
 St.dev. 1.193 1.107 1.189 1.293 1.560 1.229 0.922 
         
Number of analysts 
following 
Mean 17.648 18.219 21.254 15.718 13.857 17.527 15.591 
Median 14.000 16.000 16.000 11.000 8.000 15.000 10.000 
 St.dev. 14.920 14.296 16.608 15.117 18.263 14.534 15.445 
         
Percentage block 
shareholders 
Mean 35.972 34.384 32.199 41.720 42.587 35.239 40.496 
Median 32.000 29.980 26.000 37.445 47.750 30.690 39.835 
 St.dev. 26.337 24.533 26.291 29.414 20.072 25.950 30.050 
         
Earnings variance Mean 0.033 0.018 0.128 0.005 0.038 0.031 0.023 
 Median 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 St.dev. 0.265 0.150 0.719 0.020 0.164 0.194 0.096 
         
Declining earnings trend Mean 0.322 0.314 0.266 0.256 0.457 0.344 0.382 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 St.dev. 0.467 0.465 0.443 0.438 0.505 0.475 0.488 
         
Cumulative abnormal  Mean -0.001 0.003 -0.013 0.006 -0.030 -0.001 0.001 
returns Median 0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.009 -0.014 0.001 -0.005 
 St.dev. 0.072 0.073 0.061 0.066 0.088 0.077 0.063 
         
Number of observations   1896 525 169 234 35 823 110 
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Table 5 
Regression analysis for forecast specificity choice 
 
This table reports ordered response regressions  in which the dependent variable is forecast 
specificity. The variable takes the value of one for qualitative, two for open-ended, three for 
open-ended-Mock, four for range-Mock, five for range, and six for point forecasts. 
Regressions (1) and (2) contain the full sample. Regression (3) comprises firms without a 
cross listing in the US and/or UK and firms with a US exchange listing. Regression (4) 
contains firms without a cross listing in the US and/or UK and firms with a US OTC 
listing. Regression (5) covers firms without a cross listing in the US and/or UK and firms 
with a UK OTC listing. Each regression controls for the forecast year and the major 
industry groups based on two-digit SIC industry codes. We provide full definitions of the 
variables in Table 1 We orthogonalise the variable Number of analyst following on Ln(firm 
size). We use Huber/White standard errors (Huber, 1967; White, 1980) for calculating the 
significance. We present p-values in parentheses.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Cross listing in US/UK   -0.3925 ***       
   (0.000)        
US exchange listing     -0.3137 **     
     (0.005)      
US OTC listing       -0.5081 ***   
       (0.001)    
UK OTC listing         -0.7043 *** 
         (0.000)  
Timeline: initial forecast -1.1361 *** -1.1056 *** -1.0869 *** -1.1082 *** -1.1470 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Timeline: revision/maintenance -0.9930 *** -0.9740 *** -0.9337 *** -0.9839 *** -1.0182 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Forecast horizon -0.0024 *** -0.0025 *** -0.0025 *** -0.0026 *** -0.0026 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Sign of the news 0.0413  0.0556  0.1099 ** 0.0691  0.0580  
 (0.432)  (0.289)  (0.049)  (0.249)  (0.334)  
Ln(firm size) 0.0323 ** 0.0886 *** 0.0724 *** 0.1112 *** 0.0979 *** 
 (0.016)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Tobin's q -0.0013  -0.0057  -0.0133  -0.0112  -0.0094  
 (0.958)  (0.813)  (0.603)  (0.656)  (0.725)  
Number of analysts following -0.0064 * -0.0038  -0.0049  -0.0060  -0.0062  
 (0.084)  (0.285)  (0.264)  (0.187)  (0.223)  
Percentage block shareholders -0.0010  -0.0013  -0.0017  -0.0024 ** -0.0021 * 
 (0.317)  (0.205)  (0.118)  (0.032)  (0.051)  
Earnings variance 0.0164  0.0450  0.0225  -0.1916  -0.1870  
 (0.797)  (0.503)  (0.742)  (0.231)  (0.250)  
Declining earnings trend -0.0677  -0.0558  -0.0525  -0.0440  -0.0596  
 (0.266)  (0.358)  (0.420)  (0.520)  (0.394)  
           
N 1896  1896  1685  1504  1487  
Pseudo R2   0.078  0.082  0.083  0.077  0.093  
***: p < 1% ; **: p < 5% ; *: p < 10%                   
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Table 6 
Distribution of management forecast errors 
 
This table reports the distribution of management forecast errors of the sample of firms with a 
cross listing in the US and/or UK and the sample of firms without such a cross listing. We 
provide the number of observations of correct forecasts, underestimations, and 
overestimations. We calculate management forecast errors as realised earnings less 
management forecast divided by the absolute value of the forecast. Underestimations are 
forecasts that fall short of the earnings outcome. Overestimations are forecasts that are higher 
than the final outcome. We consider forecast errors that deviate more than four standard 
deviations from the mean as outliers and exclude these observations from our sample. In 
parentheses we include the Pearson’s χ2 statistic to test the hypotheses of independence of the 
distribution and the accompanying p-value. 
      Not cross listed   Cross listed 
Forecast specificity type     N (%)   N (%) 
Total sample Correct  657 (51%)  232 (50%) 
(χ2=0.228, p-value=0.892) Overestimation  273 (21%)  103 (22%) 
 Underestimation  361 (28%)  130 (28%) 
 Total   1291 (100%)  465 (100%) 
        
Open ended Correct  471 (81%)  190 (84%) 
(χ2=1.373, p-value=0.503) Overestimation  101 (17%)  32 (14%) 
 Underestimation  8 (1%)  4 (2%) 
 Total   580 (100%)  226 (100%) 
        
Open ended-Mock Correct  26 (93%)  4 (57%) 
(χ2=13.333, p-value=0.001) Overestimation  0 (0%)  3 (43%) 
 Underestimation  2 (7%)  0 (0%) 
 Total   28 (100%)  7 (100%) 
        
Range Mock Correct  68 (37%)  8 (18%) 
(χ2=7.024, p-value=0.030) Overestimation  37 (20%)  15 (33%) 
 Underestimation  81 (44%)  22 (49%) 
 Total   186 (100%)  45 (100%) 
        
Range Correct  44 (44%)  19 (28%) 
(χ2=18.240, p-value=0.000) Overestimation  31 (31%)  11 (16%) 
 Underestimation  24 (24%)  39 (57%) 
 Total   99 (100%)  69 (100%) 
        
Point Correct  48 (12%)  11 (9%) 
(χ2=4.160, p-value=0.125) Overestimation  104 (26%)  42 (36%) 
 Underestimation  246 (62%)  65 (55%) 
 Total   398 (100%)  118 (100%) 
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 Table 7 
Management forecast errors 
 
The table presents means, medians, standard deviations, and mean and median differences of 
management forecast errors for cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms per forecast specificity 
type. We calculate management forecast errors as realised earnings less management forecast 
divided by the absolute value of the forecast. Underestimations (i.e., underest.) are forecasts 
that fall short of the earnings outcome and overestimations (i.e., overest.) are forecasts that are 
higher than the final outcome. We consider forecast errors that deviate more than four 
standard deviations from the mean as outliers and exclude these observations from our 
sample. 
      Not cross listed   Cross listed   P-value difference 
   All Overest. Underest.  All Overest. Underest.  All Overest. Underest. 
Forecast specificity type (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (1) - (4) (2) - (5) (3) - (6) 
Total sample Mean  -0.106 -0.647 0.109  -0.031 -0.233 0.075  0.012 0.001 0.241 
 Median  0.000 -0.225 0.036  0.000 -0.123 0.029  0.918 0.000 0.092 
 St.dev.  0.633 1.172 0.329  0.229 0.400 0.128     
              
Open ended Mean  -0.150 -0.862 0.041  -0.044 -0.333 0.180  0.017 0.032 0.166 
 Median  0.000 -0.368 0.014  0.000 -0.139 0.046  0.163 0.017 0.230 
 St.dev.  0.646 1.340 0.047  0.256 0.602 0.269     
              
Range mock Mean  -0.139 -1.024 0.149  0.005 -0.186 0.137  0.286 0.067 0.849 
 Median  0.000 -0.460 0.089  0.004 -0.179 0.076  0.847 0.008 0.579 
 St.dev.  0.897 1.717 0.267  0.217 0.201 0.165     
              
Range Mean  -0.115 -0.421 0.069  0.019 -0.142 0.073  0.016 0.198 0.904 
 Median  0.000 -0.121 0.032  0.007 -0.081 0.025  0.000 0.742 0.404 
 St.dev.  0.440 0.694 0.086  0.146 0.188 0.136     
              
Point Mean  -0.033 -0.370 0.102  -0.042 -0.193 0.048  0.852 0.130 0.236 
 Median  0.005 -0.130 0.029  0.003 -0.021 0.016  0.082 0.006 0.090 
  St.dev.   0.511 0.726 0.367   0.218 0.298 0.082         
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Table 8 
Shareholder wealth effects 
 
Panel A presents the cumulative abnormal returns per group of firms with and without a cross 
listing in the US or UK. We subdivide the cross-listings group into US exchange-listed firms, 
UK exchange-listed firms, US OTC-listed firms, and UK OTC-listed firms. Panel B reports 
OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is the CAR. Each regression controls for the 
forecast year and the major industry groups based on two-digit SIC industry codes (results 
unreported). We provide full definitions of the variables in Table 1. We orthogonalise the 
variable Number of analyst following on Ln(firm size). We use White standard errors (White, 
1980) for calculating the significance. We present p-values in parentheses.  
 
Panel A: descriptive statistics abnormal returns 
  Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
N 
Non-cross listed -0.04% 0.03% 7.49% 1383 
     
Cross listed     
US exchange listing 0.31% 0.29% 6.52% 285 
     
UK exchange listing -2.52% -1.62% 5.79% 16 
     
US OTC listing -0.78% -056% 7.07% 105 
     
    UK OTC listing -0.32% 0.60% 7.12% 88 
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Panel B: regression analysis abnormal returns 
  (1) (2) (3) 
US exchange listing    0.027 *** 0.030 *** 
   (0.000)  (0.000)  
UK exchange listing   -0.010  -0.006  
   (0.507)  (0.715)  
US OTC listing   0.014  0.013  
   (0.100)  (0.128)  
UK OTC listing   0.011  0.013  
   (0.209)  (0.154)  
Range     -0.009 * 
     (0.059)  
Range Mock     -0.038 ** 
     (0.015)  
Open ended      -0.003  
     (0.567)  
Open ended Mock     -0.018 *** 
     (0.003)  
Mean forecast error     -0.002  
     (0.562)  
Timeline: initial forecast -0.019 * -0.018 * -0.017 * 
 (0.066)  (0.069)  (0.096)  
Timeline: revision/maintenance -0.025 *** -0.025 *** -0.020 ** 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.012)  
Forecast horizon 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 
 (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.003)  
Ln(firm size) -0.002 * -0.005 *** -0.006 *** 
 (0.041)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Number of analysts following 0.000  0.000  0.000  
 (0.632)  (0.920)  (0.873)  
Percentage block shareholders 0.001 * 0.001 * 0.001 * 
 (0.053)  (0.060)  (0.079)  
Tobin's q 0.000  0.000  0.000  
 (0.984)  (0.922)  (0.855)  
Earnings variance -0.010  -0.012  -0.011  
 (0.338)  (0.281)  (0.342)  
Declining earnings trend -0.031 *** -0.032 *** -0.034 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
       
N 1877  1877  1739  
Adjusted R2   0.0989  0.1071  0.1191  
***: p < 1% ; **: p < 5% ; *: p < 10%           
 
 
